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I. Introduction 
----.
 
Market concentration is often viewed as an important indicator of monopoly 
power, which makes it a key aspect for analyzing antitrust and other cases. A good 
understanding ofwhat market concentration is and how it arises is crucial to policy 
decision making, especially in today's world where large corporations often tend to 
dominate the business scene. In this paper I investigate how factors accounting for 
technological change affect market concentration holding constant the effects of other 
recognized determinants of concentration. 
The welfare implications of concentration are ambiguous and depend largely on 
the causes of high (or low) concentration. According to Mueller and Hamm (1974) 
"concentration ratios are the single best available index of the degree of oligopoly," and 
thus, market power. If firms are successful in their strategy to secure market power, they 
will be in a position to control output and raise prices, which may have negative welfare 
effects (Gwemawat, 1984). On the other hand, a number of studies in industrial 
organization yield support for the Schumpeterian hypothesis that "monopolistic and 
oligopolistic firms would more aggressively pursue innovative activity than would firms 
with little or no market power" (Waldman and Jensen). Hence, we must analyze the 
causes of concentration in industries in order to adequately assess its costs and benefits. 
In this paper I concentrate on technological innovations. 
I posit a two-way relationship between innovation and market concentration: 
Innovationt = FI (Market Concentrationt_l; Other factorst-J; (1) 
Market Concentrationt = F] (Innovationt_l; Other factorst-J. (2) 
-Fortunately these two relationships can be sorted out because of their lag 
structures and the problem of simultaneous equation bias can be avoided. Equation 1 
presumes that the market concentration that causes innovation would precede the 
innovation, while equation 2 presumes that the innovation that causes market 
concentration would precede the concentration. 
While the issues are not fully resolved, a great deal ofwork has been done 
concerning equation 1. Traditionally, firms with greater market power have been viewed 
as stodgy, and hence not innovative. A strong dissent by Joseph Schumpeter and others 
holds that monopoly profits due to concentration are a strong incentive for the innovation 
he dubs "creative destruction." Schumpeter argues that the introduction of new goods 
into the market negatively affects the demand fro the competitors' products, especially if 
the new good is superior in quality. This effect of "creative destruction" creates 
incentives for innovation, as a technological breakthrough will guarantee market power 
for its owners (Waldman and Jensen). 
Much less work has been done concerning equation 2. A few studies, such as 
Mueller and Hamm (1974) and Kessides (1990), provide evidence suggesting that 
concentration depends on technological growth and industry specific factors. I 
concentrate on understanding how technology affects variation in concentration within 
different industries. 
Recall that the core hypothesis is that concentration depends on technology, 
ceteris paribus. In particular, we hypothesize that the variation in industrial 
concentration depends on two sets ofvariables: (1) technological growth factors (such as 
R&D levels and human capital intensity), and (2) industry specific control variables 
2 
-(industry size and age, product differentiation, advertising levels and costs of entry, etc.). 
Many of these variables are difficult to measure and define, and thus, proxies have to be 
constructed. 
Part II lays out the theoretical basis for my hypotheses. A common framework is 
obtained for relating the rate of arrival of innovations (technological growth) to market 
concentration. The theoretical basis for the use of certain variables is discussed in the 
context of existing literature. In Part III, I identify the dependent variable and a range of 
independent variables that are hypothesized to be important in explaining the variation in 
market concentration. A major challenge in this section is identifying ways to represent 
those independent variables that cannot be measured directly. Part IV deals with 
empirical analysis and research design. The regression model(s) are presented and 
predictions are made about the signs of the independent variables. Part V presents and 
explains the results of the empirical model. Econometric problems are assessed. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn in Part VI, including a discussion ofpotential policy implications· 
and further research possibilities. 
II. Theory 
A large section ofliterature on industrial organization deals with explaining the 
relationship posited by equation 1 above. Scott (1984) finds that the relationship between 
market concentration and research and development (input and output) may exhibit the 
inverted-U relationship. After controlling for differences across industries in demand 
conditions and technological opportunity, though, the inverted-U relationship between 
concentration and spending on R&D disappears (Scott, 1984). Lunn and Martin (1986) 
3 
-find empirical support for the hypothesis that market power encourages investment in 
innovation in low-technology markets, as well as high-technological-opportunity 
industries. 
More recent evidence suggests that the effect ofconcentration on R&D 
expenditures can be negative, contrary to the Schumpeterian hypothesis (Bylinsky, 2000). 
In the quickly changing and technology based dot-com industry, small companies often 
invested in R&D, in hopes of getting market share. This may be attributed to low entry 
costs into the market and relatively low capital-intensity (lesser extent of economies of 
scale). 
Significantly less work has been done on explaining the reverse relationship 
between technology and concentration. As mentioned earlier, this paper focuses on 
explaining the relationship in equation 2, namely the effect of innovation on market 
concentration. 
A. General Theory 
Aghion and Howitt (1992) assume that innovations lead to vertical differentiation, 
i.e. changes in the quality of products. They assume that these innovations are "drastic" 
and introduce the notion of "creative destruction" - that "no one will continue to buy the 
qualitatively inferior goods when given a chance to buy the superior (new) product" 
(Aghion&Howitt, 1992). The article states that technological progress results from 
"competition among research firms that generate innovations" and that the more the 
extent ofcreative destruction the more volatile is the market concentration 
(Aghion&Howitt, 1992). This paper suggests that innovations put their owners at the 
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cutting edge of the market. Consequently, we can conclude that technological innovation 
yields market power for its owners, and thus should have a positive effect on 
concentration, everything else held constant. 
For the sake of generality, I assume that the effect of process innovation is the 
same as that ofproduct innovation. The incentives in the former case would be cost 
reductions, which lead to increasing profits. In fact, firms with successful process 
innovations can increase their market share by underpricing their rivals and driving them 
out of the market. This paper does not distinguish between the two kinds of innovations, 
but it is important to note that both give their owners market power, and hence are 
expected to cause concentration. 
I should note here that technology is not the only factor expected to affect 
different industries. In this study I also try to account for the extent of creative 
destruction, which will lead to a higher probability of innovations being more drastic. 
Hence, the higher the creative destruction effect, the higher the expected concentration in 
the market. 
Consider two fairly different industries: iron and steel mills andferroalloy and 
computer and peripheral equipment. This example provides an intuition for including 
explanatory variables other than technological innovation in our model. 
The combined market shares of the 8 largest firms in these are 51.4% and 52.1 %, 
respectively (US Census Bureau). In the former case, though, we are dealing with a fairly 
well established industry in which creative destruction and technological progress would 
have little significance and where high concentration would most probably be the result 
of the age and relative stability of the industry. 
5 
-On the other hand, the latter industry is more human capital intensive, and it is 
more plausible to assume that introduction of new products would have a negative effect 
on the demand for older, technologically inferior goods, and the extent of creative 
destruction would be higher. Here we are dealing with an industry best described by 
Aghion and Howitt's paper, although, again, the assumption of completeness of creative 
destruction is not fully satisfied (e.g., Intel did not stop marketing the inferior "Celeron" 
processor even after a new "Pentium 3" chip was introduced). 
In the former case (iron&steel), concentration is high due to the fact that the 
industry is relatively old and well-established, in addition to having high entry costs. In 
the latter instance (computers&peripherals), an innovation would make all the 
competitors' products relatively inferior, negatively affecting the demand for these 
products and giving the owner market power. As a result, we are facing two industries 
that have different levels of innovation and still are equally concentrated. Hence, there 
are variables, other than technological innovation, that cause concentration. These 
include industry size, growth/age, size variability and advertising. 
The basic intuition behind technological growth affecting market concentration is 
that innovations place their holders at the very frontier of the market. In this paper I try to 
flesh out the effects oftechnological growth on concentration by controlling for factors 
that account for industrial specificity, and thus, explain the extent to which innovations 
benefit their owners by providing market power. 
As a result, we are facing a major challenge of recognizing the variables that 
would account for technological growth, as well as those for industrial specificity and the 
6 
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extent ofcreative destruction. There are several studies that prove useful in identifying 
such variables. 
B. Technological Factors 
I argue that the industries in which R&D expenditures are high have a greater 
probability of a drastic innovation that would give one or several firms significant market 
power. Thus R&D expenditures are expected to have a positive effect on industrial 
concentration. 
Avner Shaked and John Sutton (1987) claim, "it is the interplay between 
consumers' tastes and the underlying technology which simultaneously determine the 
degree ofconcentration and fixed costs" (Shaked&Sutton, 1987). They use technology as 
an exogenous variable and argue that often manufacturers can keep shifting the 
technological frontier constantly forward towards more sophisticated products by 
incurring additional fixed costs in the form ofR&D expenditures. As a result, the authors 
are led to question the familiar argument that "certain industries are highly concentrated 
because the level of fixed costs involved is high" (Shaked&Sutton, 1987). Instead, they 
claim that conducting R&D gives the incumbent firms a possibility to create advanced 
products to match the growth in market demand and defer further entry. Thus, we would 
expect industries with high R&D levels to be more concentrated. In fact, we would 
expect the industries with high initial concentrations to remain largely that way. This 
would account for the extent to which incumbents dominate the market. 
I use R&D expenditures as one of the proxies for technological growth, as it is 
plausible to assume that the more a firm invests in research and development the higher 
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-its probability of making a discovery before others, and thus, being placed at the market 
frontier. Hence, the predicted sign would be positive. 
It is also important to acknowledge that investments, other than pure R&D 
expenditures, can increase the likelihood ofan innovation occurring. These would 
include installation ofnew and improved machinery and safety facilities, construction of 
buildings etc. For example, it is reasonable to suppose that working in a healthy 
environment can make the labor force more productive and even facilitate creativity. 
Together with R&D expenditures, these investments comprise the physical intensity part 
of the model for measuring technology. 
So far the emphasis has been placed strictly on the physical capital aspect of 
technological growth, namely resources committed to R&D, and nothing has been said 
about human capital intensity and its effect on technological growth and concentration. 
This is another important way ofaccounting for the rate ofarrival of innovations, and 
thus, growth (Romer, 1990). 
Paul Romer in his paper assumes that technology is "a non-rival, partially 
excludible good": once an innovation occurs, the access to it cannot be fully restricted. 
He supposes that innovations introduce a new dimension to the market by creating 
differentiated products (Romer, 1990). He also assumes that old inventions are still 
marketable and somewhat in demand. The main conclusion of the paper is that the stock 
ofhuman capital is a major determinant of technological growth. The higher the level of 
human capital (quality of labor) employed by a firm the higher its probability ofmaking 
an innovation, and thus, we would expect the concentration to be higher in industries 
where more high skilled labor is employed. It is also likely that human capital, as 
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-opposed to physical capital, is becoming more important over time as we make the 
transition from a physical capital based economy to a "knowledge" based economy. 
These proxies for technological growth (physical and human capital intensity) are 
predicted to be positively correlated with industrial concentration, ceteris paribus. Thus, 
we would expect that a relatively slow-growing (in terms of technological advances) 
industry, such as iron and steel andferroalloy manufacturing mentioned above, would 
not be highly concentrated, which is not true (recall that the market share of top 8 finns is 
above 50%). This means that there are other variables we need to include in our analysis 
in order to avoid bias in the estimates. Hence, we need to introduce a set of control 
variables. 
C. Industry Specific Factors 
There have been many studies conducted, where authors tried to include such 
explanatory variables as Industry Growth Rate, Size ofIndustry, Product Differentiation 
(Mueller&Hamm, 1974), or Existence ofSecond-Hand Marketfor Capital, Rate of 
Capital Depreciation, Sunkenness ofCosts (Kessides, 1990), or Advertising Levels 
(Mueller&Rogers, 1984 and Woodrow, 1987 and 1988), or Minimum Optimum Plant 
Size, Differentiation and Durability ofProducts (Weiss, 1963). All of these papers aim to 
provide empirical results that would explain what influences market concentration, but 
none of them have managed to obtain high R-square estimates, except for Kessides, who 
actually uses technology and some industry specific factors as control variables 
(Kessides, 1990). 
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-The task of this paper is then to pick the other explanatory variables that are 
significant determinants ofconcentration. One such variable would undoubtedly be the 
industry age; the older the industry, the less it is affected by creative destruction. The 
likelihood of an innovation being drastic is rather low in these industries. On the other 
hand, relatively new sectors ofmanufacturing tend to be more affected by creative 
destruction, as the likelihood ofa "breakthrough" would be higher. 
Unfortunately, due to unavailability ofdata, it is impossible to measure industry 
age directly, and alternative ways need to be sought. One such way is to proxy the age by 
growth. It is reasonable to suppose that an old "well established" industry would tend to 
exhibit little or no growth over a recent period of time. A relatively fast-growing industry 
would be predicted to be less concentrated: 
Industries that are growing slowly, or, worse still, declining are likely to create a 
particularly difficult 'displacement problem' for new entrants. Contrarywise, 
when an industry is growing rapidly, new fIrms face a less difficult displacement 
problem, which has the effect of reducing entry barriers.(Mueller&Hamm, 1974), 
Industry size would be another factor to affect concentration. The larger the 
absolute size of an industry and, the lower its entry barriers, and thus the lower the 
concentration ratio (Mueller&Hamrn, 1974), since "economies of scale become' less 
important' as a barrier to entry in 'large economies'" (Shaked&Sutton, 1987). Intuitively, 
it makes sense that a large market demand can accommodate for more fIrms. On the other 
hand, Shaked and Sutton argue that this is not necessarily true, as incumbent firm(s) may 
want to incur additional sunk costs in the form ofR&D and advertising expenditures 
"with a view to enhancing consumers' willingness to pay for their (respective) products" 
(Shaked&Sutton, 1987). At this point, I argue that industry size is negatively correlated 
with concentration. 
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-Another factor that would influence the extent ofcreative destruction among 
industries would be the size variability. This variable measures how volatile the industrial 
size had been historically (prior to 1997). If an industry's size were historically volatile, 
this would mean that the industry is unstable and is subject to more structural 
fluctuations. Hence, we would expect this variable to be positively correlated with 
concentration, as it is plausible to suppose that the more stable the industry (low 
variability), the less creative destruction occurs in it potentially, and the less is the 
probability of an innovation being drastic. 
Finally, I also consider advertising levels for different industries. It is particularly 
interesting to see what the effect of advertising intensity is on concentration, since there 
is major disagreement in the literature on this. Interestingly enough, different authors 
predicted different signs for the coefficient ofAdvertising Levels and after conducting 
empirical analysis, ended up finding support for their theories. Mueller and Rogers 
(1980) hypothesize that firms (especially in consumer goods industries) are able to use 
advertising to create and maintain product differentiation. The most important fmding of 
their study is that TV advertising has played an especially potent role in increasing 
concentration of these industries (Mueller&Rogers, 1984). Woodrow (1988), on the other 
hand, has found evidence that provides strong support for the view that advertising is 
actually pro-competitive and that it has a beneficial consumer welfare effect (Woodrow, 
1988). He also rejects the hypothesis that advertising reduces leading firms' market share 
instability by creating market power, and again argues that the effect of advertising is to 
decrease market concentration and increase consumer welfare. Controlling for advertising 
intensity, by including it in the regression analysis, also helps emphasize the effects of 
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-industry size. Aside from this, product differentiation creates additional barriers to entry, 
which restrict the ability ofnew firms to enter the market, and thus, could cause high 
concentration. It is not clear from the literature whether advertising would have a positive 
or a negative effect on concentration. 
In the next section I deal with formalizing the definitions of the dependent and the 
explanatory variables and finding proxies for those that cannot be measured directly. 
III. Variables 
Due to the fact that no one data set provides the information on all the variables 
that are used in the empirical analysis, three of them are combined. The combined sample 
contains data on some 386 NAICS· industries, industrial sectors ranging anywhere from 
"Lumber and Wood" to "Industrial Machinery and Equipment." The first data set used is 
obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, 1997 Economic Census, available through 
"American FactFinder" and it contains data for 536 6-digit NAICS industries for 1997. 
The second data set is obtained through EconoMagic.com and it contains the data on the 
size of the SIC industries from January 1992 to December 1997 on a monthly basis. The 
third data set is obtained through the Research and Development in Industry: 1997 annual 
report available through the National Science Foundation web page. This last data set 
contains information on R&D expenditures as a percent ofnet sales in R&D- performing 
companies by industry and size ofcompany for the years 1987 through 1997, as well as 
the data on the number of scientists employed in each industry. All industries included in 
•The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) replaced the u.S. Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) system in 1997. NAICS was developed jointly by the U.S., Canada, and Mexico to 
provide new comparability in statistics about business activity across North America (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 1997 Economic Census). 
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-the final data set are comparable to the SIC equivalents (sales or receipts from NAICS are 
within at most 3% of SIC sales or receipts). 
Unfortunately, the latter two data sets are available only for 2- and in several 
cases 3-digit SIC industries. More detailed information is confidential and can only be 
available if granted an official security clearance. Official clearance was denied. As a 
result, a large part of the data had to be generalized; the values for general industrial 
sectors are assigned to the subsectors. 
A. Dependent Variable 
There are several ways to measure market concentration. Here are only a few of 
them: CR4, the sum ofmarket shares of the four largest companies in the market, CR8, 
the sum ofmarket shares of the eight largest companies in the market, or Herfindahl­
Herschmann concentration ratio, the sum of squared market shares of all the firms in the 
market. In this paper, CR8 for 1997 is used as a measure ofmarket concentration, as this 
measure proved to be most readily available through the data sets mentioned. We denote 
concentration as C. 
B. Technological Factors 
As noted above, it is virtually impossible to measure levels of technology and its 
growth directly, since these are determined by a variety of factors. Several proxies are 
used to account for technological growth. The basic idea is that improvements in 
technology require research by highly educated people in a productive environment. 
Therefore, as outlined in section II, reasonable proxies for technology would be R&D 
expenditure, net investment and human capital ofworkers (quality oflabor) in itself 
proxied by average production wage and the number of scientists. 
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-.. All these variables are lagged, as explained below. The underlying reasoning is 
that it takes time for an innovation to get transformed from a mere idea into a 
manufacturing process, and hence, affect concentration. 
1. Research and Development (R&D) 
R&D expenditures are measured as Company and other (except Federal) 
industrial R&D funds as a percent of net sales ofR&D performing companies for 1994. 
The data are only available for the 2- and in several cases 3-digit SIC industries, and thus 
the same values are assigned to all industries within the available subgroups. The implicit 
assumption here is that the R&D expenditures do not vary among sub-industries. This 
assumption can have a negative affect on the explanatory power of the variable and we 
would expect the coefficient ofR&D to be biased towards zero. Note that the expected 
sign would be positive. 
2. Net Investment 
Net investment is to account for all the other expenditures, aside from direct 
R&D. We hypothesized that factors like good machinery or safe work environment can 
further facilitate productivity and even creativity. This variable is measured by the ratio 
of total capital expenditures minus total depreciation to total value added for each of the 
NAICS industries for 1997. The expected sign of its coefficient is positive. This is a 
rather weak proxy for innovation, as high net investment may be caused by high 
economies of scale and capital-intensive methods of production. So, capital-intensive 
industries have high expenditure on capital and they are highly concentrated even with 
constant quality of capital. If the investment variable then is highly correlated with 
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-concentration in the absence of technological innovation, it may not be a very good proxy 
for technology. 
3. Human Capital Intensity 
This variable is rather abstract and difficult to measure. Thus, proxies are 
required. There are several measures that could serve as proxies for human capital 
intensity, one of them being average educational attainment of the workers (in years). 
Unfortunately, due to unavailability of this sort of data on different industries, we are 
unable to use this proxy and other ways need to be sought. 
John S. Heywood in his paper called "Labor Quality and the Concentration­
Earnings Hypothesis" argues that workers in more concentrated industries tend to be paid 
higher wages (Heywood, 1986), and that this is because firms in highly concentrated 
industries get higher profits and can afford to share it with the workers in exchange for 
such things as loyalty, for example. I would suggest that this takes place also because of 
human capital differences. I use the 1997 ratio of total production workers' wages to total 
number of production worker hours as a proxy for human capital intensity of industries. 
This makes perfect sense when one takes into consideration the (relative) quickness of 
adjustment ofU.S. (labor) markets and low unemployment rates in recent years. A 
worker is being paid more ifhe/she is more productive (possesses more human capital), 
and vice versa. If this were not the case, then either the firm would be able to find 
someone better fitting its needs, or the worker would look for another higher-paying job. 
The expected sign for the coefficient for this variable is positive. 
Another variable used to account for human capital intensity is the number of 
R&D scientists employed by each industry (for 1994). This is a more direct measure of 
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the human capital side of the model, but unfortunately the effects are biased towards zero, 
due to the same data unavailability problems as in the case of R&D expenditures. The 
expected sign is once again positive. 
Note that the wages are not lagged. The implicit assumption here is that the wages 
stay relatively constant within industries. 
C. Industry Specific Variables 
1. Industry Size (Mueller&Harnm, 1974) 
The industry size is defined as 'total value added by the industry' 
(Mueller&Harnm, 1974). Its coefficient is expected to have a negative sign. Recall that 
the larger the industry the more room there is for more firms to emerge, and thus, 
concentration would decrease. The total industry value added for 1997 is used here. 
2. Industry Growth (Mueller&Hamm, 1974) 
Industry growth is measured by computing trends for the sizes of 2-digit SIC 
manufacturing industries. The data cover the period from January 1992 to December 
1997. These values are then assigned to the sub-industries. Again, the implicit 
assumption here is that these values do not differ among the industry sub-sectors, similar 
to the case of R&D discussed above. The expected sign is negative, although again the 
coefficient is biased towards zero. 
We should note here that industry growth could also act as an indirect proxy for 
age, as outlined earlier. The hypothesis would be that the older the industry the smaller 
would the growth variable measured by the trend. 
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3. Size Variability 
Size variability is measured by computing the variances for the sizes of 2-digit 
SIC industries from January 1992 through December 1997 (monthly data). The 
assignment to the sub-industries is done in the same manner as in the case of the growth 
variable discussed above. Recall that a large variance would mean high size volatility. 
This would indicate that the market is relatively unstable. The probability that an 
innovation will be more drastic in such market is higher and the likelihood of a small 
group of firms controlling most of the market would be higher. Hence, we would expect 
the coefficient to be positive. 
The size variability measure would act as a proxy for the extent of creative 
destruction. 
4. Advertising Intensity 
This variable accounts not only for advertising per se, but also acts as a proxy for 
product differentiation across industries. The impact ofadvertising on concentration is 
not quite clear: 
Advertisements that contain a high proportion of informational content (e.g. price 
advertising in newspapers by local retail outlets) may encourage competitive 
market structure. On the other hand, advertising to achieve product differentiation 
through subjective image-building may increase entry barriers and concentration. 
(Mueller&Rogers, 1980) 
This variable is defined as the industry's total advertising-to-sales ratio for 1997. 
For now, no prediction on the variable's coefficient sign is made. 
The information on all the above variables is summarized in Table 1 below. 
17 
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Name of the Type Proxy used and units of measurement Exp. Sign
variable
 
Industrial CR8 (the sum of market shares of the eight
 
Concentration DEPENDENT largest companies in the market) (percent)- N/A
 
(C)	 1997
 
Company and other (except Federal)
 R&D INDEPENDENT industrial R&D funds as a percent of net +(r&dI994) 
sales ofR&D performing companies - 1994 
Net Investment	 The ratio of total capital expenditures minus INDEPENDENT	 +(investment)	 depreciation to value added (percent) - 1997 
Scientists	 Number of full-time-equivalent (FTE) R&DINDEPENDENT	 +(scientistsI994)	 scientists and engineers in thousands - 1994 
The ratio of total production workers' wages Human Capital INDEPENDENT to total production worker hours ($ per hour) +Intensity (wage) 
- 1997
 
Industry Size Total value added by the industry ($ bIns.)· ­INDEPENDENT(size) 1997 
Slope of the trend line of industry total value 
Industry Growth of shipments over the period of time from INDEPENDENT(trend) January 1992 to December 1997 (monthly
 
data) (units)
 
The variance of the industry total value of
Size Variability INDEPENDENT shipments taken from January 1992 to +(variance) December 1997 (monthly data) (units)
 
Advertising
 The indUStry's total advertising-to-sales ratio Intensity INDEPENDENT	 ?(percent) - 1997 (advertising) 
• Industry size was originally measured in thousands of dollars. The measurement units are changed to billions in order 
to aid in the interpretation of the coefficients. 
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IV. Empirical Model 
After running several regressions involving different specifications, I conclude 
that the linear models provide the best fit. Two regression specifications are considered: 
one with stronger proxies and generalized data, and the other with more precise data, but 
weaker proxies. The two models are given by equations 3 and 4 respectively: 
Modell: C = a + bI*r&dI994 + ~*scientistsI994 + b3*wage + b4*trend + 
bs*variance + b6*advertising; (3) 
Model 2: C = a + b i * wage + ~*investment + b3*size + b4*advertising. (4) 
The former is a stronger model from a theoretical perspective. The level of 
technology here is proxied by the 1994 expenditures on R&D, which is the most direct 
measure of the physical capital side of the model, as well as by the number of scientists 
working in the R&D sector and the average production wage. The scientists1994 variable 
aims at accounting for the quantity ofhuman capital employed directly in research. The 
average production wage, on the other hand is to account for the quality of the overall 
labor used in the industry, as we would expect more qualified laborers to be paid higher 
wages. 
The control variables include industry growth, as measured by trend in size, size 
variability and advertising intensity. For more detailed description of the variables and 
their predicted effects, see sections II and III. 
Unfortunately, due to the problem of unavailability of data for detailed industries, 
as most of it proves to be confidential, the values for r&dI994, scientists1994, trend, and 
variance are generalized on a rather broad basis. The implicit assumption here is that 
these parameters are the same for all subsectors ofmore general (2-digit in SIC) 
industrial segments. As a result, I expect the coefficients to be biased towards zero 
19 
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Model 2, on the other hand, can be run on more sound data. It does have a few 
theoretical weaknesses though, as the most direct proxies for the level of technology had 
to be removed. Here a new, considerably weaker, measure for the physical capital side of 
technology is used - net investments. As argued in section III, this variable is a fairly 
weak proxy for innovation, as high levels ofnet investment in physical capital can be a 
result ofeconomies of scale in capital intensive industries, as opposed to expenditures on 
research and productivity enhancing factors. Industry size is used as a measure ofhow 
well-established the industries are, instead ofgrowth and variability, as in Modell. 
Advertising intensity and production wages are retained from the previous model. 
Model 2, although allowing for a higher quality of data analysis, includes rather 
weak proxies for innovation. Hence we should be careful when drawing conclusions 
based on the results of this specification. 
As discussed earlier, economic theory suggests that there may be a reverse 
relationship between innovation and industrial concentration. This raises the issue of 
simultaneous equation bias. As a result of the simultaneous equation bias, we can end up 
with inconsistent estimates for the coefficients, due to the violation of the Gauss-Markov 
condition that the disturbance term be distributed independently of the explanatory 
variables. This problem is accounted for in the design of the above models. Namely, 
lagging explanatory variables allows us to avoid such bias. In general, the question of the 
time lag that is required for an innovation to affect productivity and, eventually, 
concentration, is, in itself, of utmost importance. In the models discussed here a 3-year 
lag is used for R&D expenditures and the number of scientists. The other available years 
are 1992 and 1996. Neither yielded statistically significant results. 
20
 
---.
 
The former model is estimated using 258 observations (6-digit NAICS industries) 
with generalized data input. The latter one is run on a sample of 413 6-digit NAICS 
industries. The results are as follows: 
Model 1 (R square =.059) 
Standard Expected 
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value sign? 
Intercept 30.507 6.540 4.664 0.000 
------­
r&d1994 -1.150 1.187 -0.969 0.333 NO 
scientists1994 0.050 0.132 0.381 0.703 YES 
wage 1.421 0.492 2.889 0.004 YES 
trend -0.075 0.064 -1.172 0.242 YES 
variance 0.571 0.359 1.592 0.113 YES 
advertising 3.735 1.517 2.462 0.015 ---------­
Intercept 
Model 2 (R square = .057) 
Standard 
Coefficients Error t Stat 
28.955 5.005 5.786 
P-value 
0.000 
Expected 
sign? 
----------­
investment 0.630 0.415 1.519 0.129 YES 
wage 1.379 0.355 3.889 0.000 YES 
Size -1.200 0.577 -2.037 0.042 YES 
advertising 3.201 1.214 2.636 0.009 ---------­
When interpreting the results, we face a tradeoff between the quality of the 
proxies and their explanatory power. Modell yields very insignificant results. The only 
statistically significant coefficients are the ones for wage (l % level) and advertising (2% 
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level), and these are the oruy variables that are not generalized. Thus, we can state that an 
increase in average production wage and/or in advertising expenditures relative to total 
value added by the industry would correspond to an increase in the concentration ratio of 
that industry, as measured by eR8. These results support the initial hypothesis that 
innovation, in this case proxied by wage, causes higher concentration. Unfortunately, the 
rest of the variables prove to be highly insignificant, perhaps due to the generalized data 
sources. Recall that we expected the coefficients of the generalized variables (R&D1994, 
scientists1994, trend, variance) to be biased towards zero. It is worthwhile noting that the 
absolute size variable (measured by value added), when included in the specification, was 
also highly insignificant. 
On the other hand, the second model presents us with more conclusive results. All 
signs are as predicted and all variables are significant, except for investment (significant 
only at the 13% level). These results suggest once again that wages and advertising 
would have a positive effect on concentration as predicted. Size is also significant and 
has the predicted sign, which means that we would expect larger industries to be less 
concentrated, everything else held constant. 
The last thing we may want to look at is the significance of the regression results 
as a whole. This can be detennined by conducting an F-test, which yields that the 
probability of the fmal regression results being random is less than 0.1% in both cases. 
This is not surprising, since several coefficients in the regression outputs are highly 
significant. 
In spite ofall this, the adjusted R2 is rather low (=0.06), which means that only 
6% ofvariation in industrial concentration is explained by the present model. There may 
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-be several explanations for this. One is that there are other variables that need to be 
included in the analysis and that are important in explaining the variation in industrial 
concentration. This is very plausible, since the works discussed in the theoretical part of 
this paper all deal with different variables and in all of them authors arrive at fairly 
significant results. Thus, there may be some omitted variable bias, which would make the 
coefficients biased and the statistical tests invalid. In order to avoid such bias, we would 
then be required to include additional variables that are related to concentration. This is 
something future researchers could consider. 
There is a wide range of factors that are not included in my analysis. Most 
notably, as argued by Mueller and Hamm (1974), the beginning level ofmarket 
concentration is of utmost significance when explaining current concentration. When 
included as an explanatory variable, lagged concentration had a flooding effect. The 
coefficient was significant, but the effects of other variables were weakened. As a result, 
I chose to keep lagged concentration out of the model. 
Other important sets ofvariables barely accounted for in my analysis are those of 
entry and exit costs, product differentiation and the sunkenness of costs. These topics are 
important in themselves, and deserve special attention, perhaps a whole new research 
initiative. 
The fact that the values of R-squared for both models are fairly low may also be a 
result ofweak theoretical model, as in Model 2, or insufficient significance of the 
explanatory variables, as in Model 1. 
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-v. Results 
Unfortunately, neither of the models provides strong evidence in support of the 
initial hypothesis that innovation would positively affect market concentration by 
granting market power to its owners. In Modell, we end up with very insignificant 
coefficients for direct measures oftechnology (that is to cause innovation), and nothing 
can be concluded. Model 2, on the other hand, represents a weaker model and cannot be 
used as a basis for clear conclusions. The only proxy for technology that comes out to be 
significant in explaining the variation in concentration is average production wage. This, 
in fact, is consistent with Romer's hypothesis that human capital is the single most 
important cause of innovation. We should note that the sign for the wage variable in both 
models is positive, which means that higher human capital intensity corresponds to 
higher concentration in industries, as predicted. 
The variables for trend (growth) and size variability, although weakly significant, 
appear to have robust signs, as I tried to better fit the data and change model 
specifications. Recall that these two variables together are to account for the extent to 
which an industry is "well established" and for the extent of "creative destruction" 
respectively. The proposition is that the higher the growth rate, the younger the industry 
and the more potential for entry is exhibited, and thus, the industry is less concentrated. 
Conversely, high size variability would mean that the industry is subject to strong 
creative destruction effect and that an innovation is more likely to be drastic (higher 
extent ofcreative destruction), and thus, this industry would be more concentrated. The 
robustness of the signs for the coefficients of trend and variance in Model 1 suggests that 
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the predicted relationship may hold, although no conclusive evidence can be drawn to 
support the hypotheses. 
In Model 2, the variable for the size of an industry (total value added) also turns 
out to be significant and to exhibit the predicted sign (negative). This supports my initial 
proposition that the larger the industry, the more room there is for entry and the lower the 
concentration ratio. 
It is also interesting that the variable that accounts for advertising levels is highly 
significant and bears a positive sign in both models. This evidence seems to support the 
hypotheses stated by Mueller and Rogers that advertising creates market differentiation 
and increases market entry costs, thus positively affecting concentration. As to the 
hypothesis that advertising is welfare increasing and pro-competitive (advertising as a 
source of information), the empirical evidence provided by 1997 Economic Census does 
not seem to support this view. It may have been more useful to look closely at different 
types of advertising (e.g., TV versus others) in order to flesh out both of these effects, but 
advertising is included here just as a "control" variable. For a more in-depth discussion of 
the effects of advertising on industrial concentration see Mueller&Rogers, (1980). 
VI. Conclusions, Policy Implications and Suggestions for Further Research 
The primary focus of this paper is to flesh out the effects of technological growth 
on market concentration. I start out by hypothesizing that concentration ratios depend on 
the levels of technology in different industries. It turns out though that there are other 
factors that can cause concentration. As a result, I arrive at a final hypothesis that 
industrial concentration depends not only on technological growth, but also on industry 
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specific factors that determine the extent of creative destruction among industries. These 
industry specific factors are then included in the empirical model as control variables. 
The next step is to identify variables and proxies that would measure 
technological growth and the level ofcreative destruction. The former is proxied by the 
human capital intensity and the physical capitalJ R&D intensity variables, based on a 
proposition that the rate of arrival of technological innovations occurs as a result of 
combination of the human capital involved in the production (Romer, 1990) and the 
physical resources devoted to research and development. The basic reasoning behind this 
is that technological growth is a result of "smart people working with advanced 
machines." The following proxies for technology are identified: R&D expenditures, the 
number of scientists employed in the research sector, net investment, and last but not 
least, average production wage. 
The variables accounting for the extent of "creative destruction," "well 
establishedness" and other industry specific factors are growth, size variability, size, and 
advertising intensity. The first three relate to the stability of industry sizes, and the last 
one accounts for advertising, product differentiation levels and entry costs. 
Two empirical models are used to test the hypothesis of a positive effect of 
innovation on concentration. Model 1 includes direct proxies such as R&D expenditures 
and the number of scientists, but, due to data problems, no clear conclusions can be 
drawn. Model 2 deals with weaker proxies, but better quality ofdata. Both models yield 
positive significant coefficients for the wage variable, as predicted. Recall that the wage 
variable is to account for the human capital intensity side of the model for technology. No 
other coefficients provide significant support for the initial hypothesis. 
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The results for advertising levels seem to support the argument presented by 
Mueller and Rogers that advertising increases concentration through brand proliferation 
and product differentiation, as the coefficient estimates turned out to be significant at 
1.5% level. Various sources in literature provide different arguments relating advertising 
levels to concentration, and here we fmd evidence supporting the argument that 
advertising decreases creative destruction by creating loyalty to brands. Thus, we can 
conclude that the effect ofadvertising on concentration is positive. 
Generally, the conclusions of this study are rather ambiguous. I fail to find 
sufficient empirical evidence to support my claim that technological growth has a 
positive affect on industrial concentration, all other factors held constant. The only proxy 
that proves to be consistently significant is wage. On the other hand, a more plausible 
result is that the empirical evidence supports the argument that older industries that are 
subject to less creative destruction tend to be more concentrated, as suggested by the 
coefficients of size, growth and variance variables. 
As mentioned earlier, studying the factors influencing market concentration can 
be extremely important for policy makers. This paper is to provide a new dimension to 
the factors causing concentration, and to deciding on policies in anti-trust legislation that 
often use industrial concentration (and market shares) as a measure ofmarket power. It is 
still necessary to empirically test the relationship that is hypothesized in this paper. 
Unfortunately, restricted access to key data made this task next to impossible at this 
point. If supported though, the results here would suggest that high concentration may not 
always be bad for the economy, since it may be a result of high technological growth in 
the industry. It is also shown that high concentration may be attributed to the fact that 
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some industries are "well established," that is they do not significantly vary in size. In the 
latter case, the opportunities for additional entry would be limited and we would expect 
high concentration ratios even though technology does not grow as fast. All these factors, 
together with ones considered in literature are to help us understand the origin of 
industrial concentration, and thus, improve our ability to implement meaningful policies. 
There are three ways this research can be developed further: 1) finding more 
independent variables to explain the origin of concentration, which would increase R2, 2) 
applying similar reasoning to another sector of industry (e.g., Finance&Insurance or 
Information), 3) trying to solve the problem of data unavailability for the key measures of 
technology levels among industries. All three require further investigation and will 
hopefully provide a better explanation of what factors affect industrial concentration and 
how. 
It would also make sense to extend the main ideas of this paper into international 
markets, or try to perform a similar analysis using data from a foreign country, and then 
compare the conclusions identifying the differences and trying to explain them 
theoretically. This will require a more complicated analysis, incorporating factors 
accounting for trade and political structure of the countries studied. Another possible 
topic for future research is investigating how changes in the structure of the consumer 
demand would influence market concentration. It would be extremely interesting to see 
whether changes in consumer tastes and preferences, as well as consumer income, 
education, etc. can influence market concentration. 
-,. ~. 
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